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SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A COMMENT 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff* 
Constitutional law casebooks are based on an unstated, and 
perhaps unrecognized, set of assumptions that link constitutional 
law to a strong conception of the nation-state. This is the ex-
plicit message of the periodicization of constitutional law into a 
Founding Period, Reconstruction, and the New Deal forward. 
Each stage represents a new and larger understanding of the 
reach of federal power. Concomitant "rise of rights" narratives 
reinforce the onward and upward march of the state. The rights 
are state-based-that is, they arise from constitutional provisions 
and statutes, not international law or human rights conven-
tions-and state-enforced. Their implementation has required 
the deployment of significant state resources and the develop-
ment of sophisticated state apparatuses. There is surprisingly lit-
tle in either orthodox or revisionist accounts that destabilize the 
state. (While post-modern and critical perspectives offer obvi-
ous destabilization vantage points, traditional conservative and 
liberal theory could do the same through notions of natural 
rights and universalism.) 
Don't get me wrong. I'm a fan of the nation-state. It is, I 
believe, the only organized political force able to effectively pur-
sue social justice and social peace. My purpose here is to note 
the rather unselfconscious way in which constitutional casebook 
writers "assume the state." By this I mean that casebooks begin 
with an implicit model of a state exercising (lawful) authority 
over a people (citizens) and territory. The major questions ad-
dressed are the scope of that authority and its distribution 
among various state agents (federalism, separation of powers). 
Citizens are figured as both authors (Marbury) and objects of 
state power (regulated, e.g., under the commerce clause); and 
significant attention is paid to constitutional norms condemning 
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"second-class citizenship" (equal protection, privileges and im-
munities). 
But this seems to start the story in the middle. "We the 
People" are busy governing and being governed while we reside 
on the territory of the United States. Yet we have not investi-
gated who fits within the category of "We the People," nor how 
territory was acquired. More important, it is also a very limited 
story: it does not seek to problematize membership rules or ex-
amine whether state power extends beyond territorial borders; it 
ignores other polities within our midst (Indian tribes; territorial 
governments); it doesn't recognize levels of membership (immi-
grants, residents of the District of Columbia); and it fails to ask 
what force legal norms established outside the nation-state could 
or should have. 
Perhaps this is a somewhat random list of topics. But I 
think the issues fit within a category I will call "sovereignty 
studies." First let me note the range of questions that could be 
addressed under this heading. Then I will suggest why doing so 
might be worthwhile. 
THE CONTENT OF "SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES" 
Constitutional casebooks would not have to craft unlikely 
hypotheticals to address issues related to nation-state sover-
eignty. The U.S. Reports offer up a wide array of interesting, al-
ready-decided cases. Consider the following: 
1. Citizenship: The issues here are as challenging as they 
are obvious: what are the norms for determining who constitute 
"We the People"? Most casebooks have snippets from Dred 
Scott (including the infamous lines that permit an easy expres-
sion of outrage-and ignoring interesting questions about con-
gressional regulation of the territories and state regulation of 
citizenship). But there is almost no discussion of the background 
of, or justification for, the American system of jus soli (written 
into the Constitution to overturn Dred Scott).1 
1. For a discussion of the case for jus soli, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, 
Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 54 (1997) (discussion of 
birthright citizenship rationale and impact of a departure from "birthplace rule"); see 
also Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in 
the American Polity (Yale U. Press, 1985) (arguing that Fourteenth Amendment does not 
mandate citizenship for children born in the United States to undocumented aliens). 
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Nor is there mention of the birthright citizenship of tribal 
Indians (denied, as a constitutional matter, in Elk v. Wilkins) or 
persons born in the territories, or of the dramatic Warren Court 
cases all but eliminating Congress' power to terminate U.S. citi-
zenship (Afroyim v. Rusk.and its progeny). (Bickel has an inter-
esting critique of the denationalization cases in The Morality of 
Consent; but they have otherwise gone largely unnoticed among 
constitutional generalists.) 
2. Immigration: Citizenship law regulates access to state 
membership; immigration law regulates access to state territory. 
The Constitution does not specifically list the power to en-
act immigration laws, and early immigration cases declared such 
power to be "inherent" in the national state. These cases display 
a source of power not usually examined in casebook chapters on 
congressional authority. (We frequently talk of enumerated 
rights, but rarely of the state's unenumerated powers.) Recent 
scholarship has noted the influence of these cases on the Court's 
Curtiss-Wright decision, suggesting that recognition of a broad 
foreign affairs powers owes more to 19th century precedents 
than to New Deal ideas about expansive federal authority.2 (The 
Chinese Exclusion Case and other immigration cases of the day 
are also remarkable social texts-on a par with Dred Scott-re-
garding attitudes towards immigrants of color.) 
It is rarely noted that most of the rights protected by the 
Constitution are not limited to citizens. How, then, ought consti-
tutional membership be defined?3 Why isn't the category of 
rights-holders congruent with the category of governors? Equal 
protection doctrine establishes separate rules for states and the 
federal government (compare Graham v. Richardson with 
Mathews v. Diaz). How does this structure comport with the 
usual story we tell about Brown and Bolling v. Sharpe? 
3. Indian cases: Casebooks talk of the dual sovereignty of 
the federal government and the states. But from the earliest 
2. See generally Sarah H. Oeveland, The Plenary Power Background of Curtiss· 
Wright, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1127 (1999) (commentary on White's article and the issue of 
nineteenth-century origins of doctrine of inherent plenary power); G. Edward White, 
The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1 
(1999) (review of early twentieth-century constitutional jurisprudence on foreign rela· 
lions). 
3. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 Const. Comm. 9 (1990) (suggesting that concept of membership might 
embrace legal resident aliens as well as citizens). Plyler v. Doe presents this question in 
most stark form. 
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days, Indian tribes have been recognized as sovereign political 
bodies. John Marshall's "trilogy" is rarely read, but speaks vol-
umes about the preexisting sovereignty of the tribes, federal 
powers and federalism. 
As with immigration, Congress is deemed to have "plenary 
authority" over the tribes, but the source and scope of such 
power is controversial and contested (again, an appropriate 
question for an introductory law class considering heads of fed-
eral power). The Court has held that the Bill of Rights does not 
apply to the actions of tribal governments (Talton v. Mayes). 
How can that be? How can there be a government on U.S. terri-
tory not bound by the Constitution? 
4. Territories cases: The debate over territorial power at 
the turn of the 19th century is responsible for two well-known 
statements in constitutional law: that the Constitution "follows 
the flag" and that the Supreme Court "follows the election re-
turns." The Insular Cases (and other territorial cases) represent 
great theoretical battles, as the Court had to come to grips with 
the constitutional implications of American empire building.4 
The Court's recognition of Congress' "plenary power" over the 
territories (compare Taney's view in Dred Scott) was based on 
the widely-shared view that the (uncivilized) residents of the 
new possessions required federal tutelage-they were, in 
Kipling's 1899 formulation, the "white man's burden." The 
cases thus resonated with the Court's race and Indian cases of 
the day, yet provide a marked contrast to the usual stories we 
tell about restrictions on state power in the age of Lochner. 
Puerto Rico was established as a "Commonwealth" in 1952, 
but exactly what that means in constitutional terms has remained 
unclear. Congress has maintained that it has plenary power to 
alter the government of Puerto Rico as it sees fit; the Common-
wealth has asserted that Congress may not change its organic law 
without Commonwealth consent. Puerto Ricans, who have been 
citizens since 1917, pay no federal income tax and do not vote in 
presidential elections. The Supreme Court has slowly granted 
residents of the island most constitutional rights, but federal laws 
treating them less favorably than citizens of the states are subject 
to minimal judicial review. 
4. The argument that the Constitution applied in the territories was an arrow in the anti-
imperial quiver: since it was generally agreed that Filipinos and other new ''nationals" were not 
civilized enough to assume full membership in the American polity, recognition that they were 
entitled to political rights would force Congress to dispose of the territories. 
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Twice in the past decade Puerto Ricans have voted on 
status. (The last time "none of the above" won.) The prospect 
of Puerto Rican statehood would align a state's borders with na-
tionality, presenting very different kinds of federalism issues. 
The option of "enhanced commonwealth status"-under which 
Puerto Rico could resist the application of some federal laws-
would strike at Congress' plenary power.5 
5. Extraterritorial authority of the state: When the United 
States acts overseas against U.S. citizens or non-citizens, does 
the Constitution apply?-a question that might be of some in-
terest in an era in which the U.S. is the only world superpower. 
Cases such as Reid v. Covert and United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez receive little or no treatment in most casebooks. Ger-
ald Neuman's excellent book Strangers to the Constitution: Im-
migrants, Borders and Fundamental Law provides rich historical, 
theoretical and case-based materials. 
WHY "SOVEREIGNTY STUDIES"? 
One might offer the following response to this list of issues: 
So what? There are lots of interesting constitutional topics that 
don't fit into the curriculum (e.g., the Gold Clause Cases, Abel-
man v. Booth (my favorite), and the direct tax cases6). Life is 
short and class time even shorter. Why should space be made 
for the-admittedly interesting-sovereignty cases? 
This answer, I believe, starts with the recognition that the 
nation-state is not "natural." That we live in a world of nation-
states should not immunize that form of political organization 
from critical analysis. In particular, the claims of liberal demo-
cratic states to territorial sovereignty and control over the rules 
of membership need to be interrogated. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that the nation-
state form will be around forever. We are currently witnessing 
5. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Pueno Rico and the Constitution: Co-
nundrums and Prospects, 11 Const. Comrn. 15 (1994) (overview of constitutional issues 
on scope of federal power over Puerto Rico and rights of its residents). The territories 
are diverse in their interests and their political relationship with the mainland. Guam, 
where the indigenous Chamorro people have lost majority status, would like to be able to 
adopt its own immigration policy. The people of American Samoa are nationals but not 
citizens of the United States. The people of the Freely Associated States of Micronesia 
are neither U.S. citizens nor nationals, yet the U.S. government assumes responsibility 
for their external security. 
6. See generally Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1 (1999). 
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serious challenges to nation-state sovereignty from three direc-
tions. First, supra-national norms and structures (international 
human rights law, the WTO) impinge upon sovereignty in un-
precedented ways. The claim here is not that states have been 
hermetically sealed up to this point; it is rather that interference 
in state sovereignty is now being justified in legal terms that 
carry increasing weight around the world. 
Second, subnational groups are demanding (and receiving) 
increasing degrees of autonomy (Scotland, East Timor, Cana-
dian Indian bands). In the United States, devolution has largely 
been discussed in federalism terms; and demands of minority 
groups have generally followed a civil rights/anti-discrimination 
agenda. But throughout much of the rest of the world, indige-
nous and ethnic groups have pursued more robust models of 
self-governance.7 Although all but ignored by constitutional 
casebooks, these issues have been seriously debated in the 
United States for more than two centuries (regarding the sover-
eignty of Indian tribes) and are currently major topics in Puerto 
Rico and Guam. 8 
As international norms regarding the rights of indigenous 
people continue to mature/ their importance for U.S. constitu-
tional law should increase. More importantly, political move-
ments elsewhere in the world will likely influence activities in the 
territories and on the reservations. In short, these will be signifi-
cant constitutional questions in the days ahead. 
I will label the third dimension along which sovereignty is 
under challenge as "transnationalism" -the presence within 
state borders of communities of non-nationals with significant 
ties across borders. Transnationalism is a function of the high 
levels of immigration that most liberal democratic states have 
witnessed in the past several decades.10 Immigrant populations 
expose a fundamental paradox in liberal democratic thought: 
liberalism purports to be grounded on universal norms of indi-
vidual rights, yet democracies need a definition of "the demos" 
in order to be functioning polities.11 
7. See generally Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (1993). 
8. There is a small and sophisticated group of scholars exploring issues relating to 
tribal sovereignty but almost no scholarly attention to Guam. 
9. See generally James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (Oxford U. 
Press, 1996). 
10. The numbers here are not trivial: almost 10% of the U.S. population today is 
foreign-born. 
11. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1982): "The exclusion of 
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By placing outsiders inside-making immigrants subject to 
state control but not permitting participation in governance-
immigration makes this tension palpable. In legal terms, it is the 
tension between Plyler v. Doe and Proposition 187; between 
equal protection and the 1996 immigration acts that made per-
manent resident aliens ineligible for means-tested social benefits. 
Transnationalism is also a story about the growing ties be-
tween immigrant populations and their countries of origin (as 
well as increasing levels of dual nationality). To some, transna-
tionalism presents real risks to the nation-state because it pro-
duces dual loyalty. Double commitments may be especially 
troubling to states that have no unifying ethnic or religious basis 
and thus look primarily to forms of civic attachment to hold het-
erogeneous populations together. Concerns are heightened 
when the governments of the countries of origin seek the sup-
port of their extra-territorial populations in relations with re-
ceiving states. One forum in which these concerns play out is the 
controversy over naturalization oaths that demand that new citi-
zens renounce allegiance to all other states. (The United States 
has had a renunciation requirement since its first naturalization 
statute in 1790; Australia and Canada do not require renuncia-
tion.) Such requirements are increasingly problematic because 
of new laws in sending states that permit nationals to naturalize 
elsewhere without losing their original citizenship.12 How does 
the receiving state assure itself of the "loyalty" of new citizens-
a loyalty now considered more important in light of the chal-
lenges to sovereignty just identified? 
Together, these issues make our usual assumptions about 
sovereignty appear naive. American constitutional law can con-
tinue to proceed as if we know who "We the People" are, as if 
sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, but the world is changing 
around us. There are ample materials at hand with which to be-
gin to address these increasingly important issues. I suggest we 
begin to put them front and center in our teaching materials. 
aliens from basic governmental processes is not a deficiency in the democratic system but 
a necessary consequence of the community's process of political self-definition. Self-
government ... begins by defining the scope of the community of the governed and thus 
of the governors as well: Aliens are by definition outside of this community." See gen-
erally Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality and the Difference That Alienage Makes, 
69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1047 (1994) (analysis of alien status under law). 
12. See generally Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 
Emory L.J. 1411 (1997) (overview of dual nationality and problems with attempts to curb dual 
nationality). 
